An Analysis of Twentieth-Century Epistemology: The Turn from Idealism to Realism

Abstract

The primary objective of this article is to examine and structurally analyze the twentieth-century epistemological turn from idealism to realism, to elucidate the key components of this transition—such as metaphysical realism and scientific realism—and to explain how concepts such as “truth,” “objectivity,” and “ontological independence” were reconstructed in light of the correspondence theory of truth. The present study employs a descriptive-analytical method together with a critical-academic approach. To this end, drawing on primary philosophical sources, up-to-date and authoritative entries in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, and works by prominent philosophers in the analytic tradition and philosophy of science, including Moore, Russell, Chakravartty, Miller, and Psillos, the development of this epistemological transformation was identified and analyzed. The analyses were organized around four major dimensions: metaphysical foundations, philosophy of science, theories of truth, and epistemic norms. The findings derived from the analysis of philosophical texts and documents are formulated along the following lines: (1) Roots of the rupture: the turn toward realism resulted from the synergistic effects of G. E. Moore’s critique of the idealist fallacy, Russell’s logical analysis of language, and the replacement of the doctrine of internal relations with a theory of external relations. (2) The catalytic role of science: the instrumental and empirical successes of the natural sciences, together with the defense of unobservable entities through the “no-miracles argument,” established the epistemic legitimacy of scientific realism in opposition to instrumentalism and naïve empiricism. (3) Revival of the correspondence theory of truth: in contrast to idealism, which regarded truth as the internal coherence of beliefs, realism, by reformulating the correspondence theory, demonstrated that the truth value of propositions depends on “states of affairs” in a mind-independent world. (4) Redefinition of objectivity and independence: contemporary realism, particularly critical realism, while acknowledging conceptual and linguistic mediation, distinguishes between the “epistemic dependence of cognition on concepts” and the “ontological dependence of reality on the mind,” thereby redefining objectivity in terms of public, intersubjectively accessible, and criticizable standards. The twentieth-century epistemological turn transformed the human being from a “creator of meaning” into an “inquirer into meaning.” The results indicate that modern realism establishes a dynamic balance between acknowledging the fallibility of human knowledge and insisting on the independent existence of an objective world. While recognizing the active role of the mind in the process of conceptualization, this approach safeguards scientific rationality and objectivity against emerging postmodern currents and radical relativism.