Jurisprudential Rules Governing Sex Reassignment and Its Consequences in Iranian Family Law

Abstract

Sex reassignment is among the newly emerging jurisprudential–legal issues that has attracted extensive attention from jurists and legal scholars in recent decades. Using a descriptive–analytical method and juristic reasoning (ijtihād), the present study examines the arguments of proponents and opponents of sex reassignment in Imami (Shiʿi) jurisprudence and Sunni jurisprudence, as well as its legal consequences within the Iranian legal system. The findings indicate that Imami jurists generally consider sex reassignment permissible in two situations: cases of khunthā mushkil (intersex individuals with indeterminate sex) and cases involving necessity or severe psychological hardship. They ground this permissibility in the principles of lā ḍarar (no harm), lā ḥaraj (no undue hardship), necessity, and secondary rulings. In contrast, most Sunni jurists—except in cases of intersex individuals—regard sex reassignment as an instance of “altering God’s creation” (taghyīr khalq Allāh) and therefore prohibited. Following sex reassignment, all religious and legal rulings—including those related to marriage, inheritance, blood money (diya), guardianship, waiting period (ʿidda), and maintenance (nafaqa)—are determined according to the individual’s new sex, and any prior marriage contract is dissolved if one of the spouses undergoes sex reassignment. The results confirm that the dynamic nature of Shiʿi jurisprudence, through reliance on secondary principles, is capable of addressing contemporary social needs and underscore the necessity of enacting explicit regulations concerning civil registration, social protections, and judicial practice.