A Jurisprudential and Legal Analysis of the Final Breath of Life in Homicide

Abstract

The present study examines, from a jurisprudential and legal perspective, the concept of the “final breath of life” (unstable life) in cases of homicide. The final breath of life constitutes an intermediate condition in which an individual stands on the threshold of death; limited vital signs (such as a weak heartbeat, respiration dependent on mechanical ventilation, or minimal basic biological activity) persist, yet a return to independent and stable life (stable life) is practically impossible. The central question of this research is whether terminating this condition (for example, by withdrawing life-sustaining support) may be regarded as constituting the requisite physical conduct necessary to satisfy the material element of homicide (the deprivation of the life of a living human being possessing full inviolable life), or not. Using an interpretive–analytical method and drawing upon the sources of Imāmī jurisprudence, legal doctrine, and medical science, the findings indicate that in Imāmī jurisprudence the final breath of life is often equated with the separation of the soul from the body, and the individual in such a condition is regarded as legally equivalent to a deceased person; accordingly, acts committed against such a person are considered offenses against a corpse rather than homicide. Article 372 of the Islamic Penal Code (enacted in 2013) explicitly reflects this jurisprudential distinction within Iranian criminal law and allocates responsibility among the involved parties: the first person (the one who creates the condition of unstable life, such as by inflicting the initial injury) is subject to qiṣāṣ (retaliation in kind) or payment of diyah (blood money) for the inflicted injury, while the second person (the one who terminates the final breath of life, such as by withdrawing support without causing a new direct injury) is deemed to have committed an offense against a corpse. Consequently, such conduct generally does not fulfill the material element of homicide or may lack criminal characterization altogether (within the framework of forensic medical determination and the consent of the legal guardian). The central role of Imāmī jurisprudence in defining death on the basis of the separation of the soul, the role of medical science in the precise diagnosis of brain death and unstable life, judicial interpretation of Article 372, and the challenges arising from legislative gaps concerning the precise boundary between life and death constitute key aspects of this research. The study concludes that the jurisprudential and legal distinction between stable life and the final breath of life forms the principal basis for analyzing criminal liability in homicide, and that legislative reconsideration is necessary in order to harmonize the foundations of Imāmī jurisprudence, the findings of modern medical science, and criminal law, so as to eliminate judicial ambiguities and ensure criminal justice.