The Position of the Divisions of Intellectual Perception in Mulla Sadra’s Philosophical System and Its Relation to Other Forms of Perception

Abstract

Perception, or apprehension, in philosophy is one of the significant epistemological issues and the most important step in understanding the self and existence, playing a fundamental role in recognizing the nature of the relationship between human beings and the universe. This subject has received attention among the views of many philosophers of both the East and the West, including Iranian philosophers and especially those of the Islamic era. Philosophers, in their works, have transmitted the opinions of their predecessors, subjecting them to critique, acceptance, or rejection. Comparative philosophy is not merely the study of the views of philosophers on one or more philosophical topics or among various philosophical schools. In most of these writings, the process leads to examining and explaining the similarities, differences, commonalities, and distinctions of the subject under discussion. One of the important philosophical topics that holds significance in comparative philosophy is the issue of cognition. In line with the purpose of this research, the position of the divisions of intellectual perception in Mulla Sadra’s philosophical system and its relation to other forms of perception is explained. The results of the study indicate that Mulla Sadra does not consider the intellect sufficient for attaining all sciences and truths, as the human intellect has specific limits that should not be exceeded; however, in terms of accepting truths, it is unlimited with respect to other sources and means. Therefore, Mulla Sadra affirms intuitive knowledge. The intellect, due to being confined within the bounds of concepts, is incapable of perceiving many truths. Mulla Sadra considers the true path to knowledge of the realities of things to be through the way of intellectual unveiling and intuition, beyond mere rational reasoning. In this regard, Mulla Sadra’s view is comparable to Kant’s statement that we do not have access to the essence of things through reason, and noumena do not appear to us to be known.